Related-key attack (RKA) is a kind of side-channel attack considered for kinds of cryptographic primitives, such as public key encryption, digital signature, pseudorandom functions etc. However, we note that the RKA-security seems to be not considered for identity-based signature (IBS), which is an important primitive for identity-based cryptography and proposed by Shamir in 1984. In this paper, for the first time, we introduce the RKA security into IBS schemes and try to define the security model for it. More specifically, we consider the RKA occurs in the users' signing key or the master key of the key-generation center (KGC), which derives two kinds of RKA securities for IBS. Meanwhile, we illustrate that the most efficient Schnorr-like IBS scheme proposed by Galindo and Garcia is RKA-insecure by launching a simple RKA. However, a slight modification of it yields a RKA-secure IBS scheme, for which we give the detailed security proof in the random oracle. Finally, the performance analysis shows that the modified scheme is still extremely efficient but has higher security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature is a fundamental primitive in public key cryptography [18] , which ensure the authenticity of the originator of a digital document as well as the integrity of that document. A signature for some digital document is valid if it can pass the verification test algorithm, which usually needs a verification key sent from the originator as input. Hence, external binding between the verification key and the signing entity is needed. The general way is using certificate from a trusted certification authority.
In 1984, Shamir proposed a new concept named identity-based signature (IBS) [21] . The basic idea is to use some well-known information of the signer, such as email, identity card number or an IP address etc., as the verification key. In this case, the external binding for verification key and signing entity is not needed. The reason why it is preferred by researchers or engineers lies in that it drops the intricate management of certificate. Note that, in IBS system, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Aneel Rahim . the signing key is issued by a trusted key generation center (KGC), who has a master private key and is in charge of generating, assigning and delivering the private signing key, via a confidential channel to each user, instead of itself. Since then, many IBS schemes based on kinds of assumptions are proposed, such as [2] , [5] , [10] , [17] , [19] .
A. RELATED-KEY ATTACK
In 2003, Bellare and Kohno first proposed the notion of related-key attack (RKA) [4] , which a new-type attack on many cryptographic primitives. Informally, by fault injection or other means, it is possible for an attacker to induce modifications of a hardware-stored key, which may be an encryption key for symmetric system, a decryption key for a public key system, a signing key for a signature scheme or a master private key for identity-based system. If this attacker can subsequently observe the outcome of the cryptographic primitive under this modified key, then RKA occurs. In order to give a quantitative analysis on RKA security, a relatedkey deriving function family , describing how the (private) key is modified, is usually used. Hence, the -RKA securities for kinds of primitives are often considered. Of course, the larger , the stronger RKA security.
In recent years, RKA security is broadly accepted in practice as a requirement. In fact, the famous algorithm of advanced encryption standard (AES) was designed with the explicit goal of resisting RKAs. Hence, it seems to become a standard security for kinds of cryptographic primitives or schemes. For example, in [3] , Bellare et al. showed how to leverage the RKA security of blockciphers to provide RKA security for high-level primitives. In [22] , Wee considered the RKA security of public key encryption systems. In [7] , Bhattacharyya and Roy considered the security of message authentication code against RKA. At the same time, Ding and Guan launched RKA on the Grain-128a stream cipher. Then Cui et al. introduced RKA security into the protocol of POR (Proof of Retrievability) with public verifiability [14] . In 2015, Morita et al. proved that the famous Schnorr signature and DSA algorithms are not RKA-secure but a slight modification of them yielded fully RKA secure schemes [20] . In [11] and [13] , Chang et al. respectively introduced the RKA security into the model of network coding signature (see [12] ) and identity-based homomorphic signature schemes. However, note that in [13] , the authors only considered the RKA occurs for KGC although in the whole identity-based homomorphic signature scheme the signer also has a secret key.
Since IBS is also an essential cryptographic primitive, introducing RKA into IBS system and clarifying the RKA security of various constructions are of interest from both a practical and a theoretical point of view. However, as far as we know, they are not considered in the past literatures.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, for the first time, we define the RKA security model for IBS system. As we have known that, in IBS scheme, the private key sk ID of a user with identity ID is derived from a master private key msk of KGC. In fact, the keys sk ID (for user) and msk (for KGC) should be protected and kept secret for the whole system. Therefore, we consider the RKA occurs in different levels: in the user level and KGC level.
Concretely, if an attacker can obtain the hardware device of the user, in which the signing key is stored, tries to induce modification of it and observes the signatures generated by this modified signing key, then we call RKA occurs in the user level. Informally, if an IBS scheme IBS is still secure when the signing key of any user is modified according to some family and the ''new'' signatures under this modified key can be observed by an attacker, then IBS is called -UserKey-RKA secure.
Similarly, if the RKA with respect to some family is launched on the master private key of KGC instead of the signing keys of some users, and this IBS can be kept secure, then we call it is -MasterKey-RKA secure.
For the concrete implementation, we choose the extremely efficient Schnorr-like IBS scheme proposed by Galindo and Garcia in [17] (GG-scheme for short) and consider its RKA security. As a result, the GG-scheme becomes completely insecure under simple related-key attacks in the user or KGC levels. 1 In order to obtain RKA secure IBS scheme, we modify the original GG-scheme, and prove that the modified GG-scheme can achieve Lin -UserKey-RKA and Lin -MasterKey-RKA securities, respectively, where Lin and Lin are two families consisting of ''linear functions'' of the corresponding keys. Performance analysis shows that the modified GG-scheme is still extremely efficient and hence is suitable for lightweight applications.
C. ORGANIZATIONS
The whole paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first introduce some basic notations and primitives. In Section 3, we present the RKA-insecurity of the original GG-scheme in the user level and KGC level, respectively. In Section 4, we modify the GG-scheme and prove that the modified one can achieve some RKA security. In Section 5, we analyze the performance of the modified one in terms of communication and computational efficiencies, and then compare it with the original GG-scheme. Conclusions can be found in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notations: In the whole paper, we denote by λ the security parameter of algorithms. For a set X , the symbol x $ ← − X means that randomly choose element x from X . For a positive number q, |q| denotes its binary length and [q] denotes the set {1, 2, · · · , q}. PPT is an abbreviation of probabilistic polynomial time. A function f (λ) is called negligible if, for any c > 0, there exists a λ 0 ∈ Z such that for any λ > λ 0 , it holds that f (λ) < λ −c .
A. DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM
For a cyclic group G with prime order q and generator g, randomly pick r ∈ Z q and compute h = g r . If, for any PPT adversary A, the probability of outputting r (denoted by Adv DL G, A (λ)) is negligible when given the tuple (q, g, h, G), then we call the discrete logarithm problem on G is hard.
B. MULTIPLE-FORKING LEMMA
Here, we recall the multiple-forking lemma proposed by Boldyreva et al. in [8] , which is a further generalization of the general forking lemma in [6] .
Lemma 1: Assume that IG is a PPT algorithm, which is called input generator, and outputs a string X . Let Z be a set with size |Z | ≥ 2 and Q be a positive integer. For h 1 , · · · , h Q ∈ Z , another PPT algorithm F takes X , h 1 , · · · , h Q as inputs and outputs the tuple of (I , J , V ), where 0 ≤ J < I ≤ Q and V is some side information.
For the input X from IG, a forking algorithm B F , n works as follows.
Assume that
then it holds that
An IBS scheme IBS consists of the following four algorithms.
• IBGen: For the input of security parameter λ, it generates a master public/private key pair (mpk, msk), where mpk is publicly known by other algorithms.
• IBExt: For the inputs of msk and a user's identity ID, the key-extraction algorithm outputs a private key sk ID for this user.
• IBSign: Take as inputs ID, sk ID and a message m. This algorithm outputs a signature σ .
• IBVerify: Take as inputs mpk, ID and a messagesignature pair (m, σ ). It outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject). The correctness requires that, for any λ ∈ {0, 1} * , ID ∈ {0, 1} * , m in the message space, (mpk, msk) ← IBGen(λ), sk ID ← IBExt(msk, ID), and σ ← IBSign(ID, sk ID , m), it holds that 1 ← IBVerify(mpk, ID, (m, σ )).
1) -USERKEY-RKA SECURITY
Here, we first introduce the -UserKey-RKA security of the above IBS scheme IBS, where is a function family consisting of functions from user's key space to itself. Concretely, we consider the following game played by an adversary A and a challenger CH . Exp
gives mpk to A.
• Queries. The adversary A is allowed to adaptively make the following two kinds of queries.
-Extraction. A submits ID to the challenger CH , who will run
and return sk ID to A. -Signing. 2 
and give σ to A.
• Forgery. Finally, the adversary A outputs a forgery (ID * , (m * , σ * )). If 1 ← IBVerify(mpk, ID * , m * , σ * ), and 1) ID * has never been submitted to CH for its private key, 2) σ * should not be the answer of A's query (I, ID * , m * ) to the signing oracle, where I is the identity function in , then A is called winning the game. If for any PPT adversary A, the probability of its winning the game, which is denoted by Adv -UserKey-RKA IBS, A (λ), is negligible, then we call the above scheme IBS is -UserKey-RKA secure.
2)
-MASTERKEY-RKA SECURITY Next, we introduce the -MasterKey-RKA security on the scheme IBS, where is a function family consisting of functions from master key space to itself. Concretely, we consider the following game played by an adversary A and a challenger CH . Exp
and return sk φ ID to A.
and give σ to A .
• Forgery. Finally, the adversary A outputs a forgery (ID * , (m * , σ * )). to the signing oracle, then A is called winning the game. If for any PPT adversary A , the probability of its winning the game, which is denoted by Adv -MasterKey-RKA IBS, A (λ), is negligible, then we call the above scheme IBS is -MasterKey-RKA secure.
III. THE RKA INSECURITY OF GG-SCHEME A. THE GG-SCHEME
In this subsection, we recall the GG-scheme IBS GG , which is proposed by Galindo and Garicia in [17] , as follows.
• GG-IBGen: For the input of security parameter λ, it chooses a cyclic group G with prime order q (|q| ≤ λ) and generator g. Let H 1 , H 2 be two hash functions from {0, 1} * to Z q . Then randomly choose z ∈ Z q and set h = g z . Output the master public key mpk = (q, g, G, h, H 1 , H 2 ) and the master private key msk = z.
• GG-IBExt(msk, ID): This algorithm randomly chooses r $ ← − Z q and computes
Output the private key sk ID = (g r , y) for ID. We remark that the part g r can be publicly known by others even though it is part of ID's private key.
• GG-IBSign(ID, sk ID , m): First, parse sk ID as (g r , y) and randomly choose t
Finally, output the signature σ = (A, R, c) ∈ G 2 × Z q . If it is, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
The correctness of GG-scheme can be easily verified.
B. RKA ON GG-SCHEME
In this subsection, we illustrate that the above GG-scheme is RKA-insecure by presenting concrete RKA on it. In fact, we consider its RKA insecurities in the following two cases.
• RKA in user level. Note that the private key sk ID for user ID consists of two parts: g r and y, where g r can be publicly known and the second part y is the essential private key. Hence, we only consider the RKA on the second part. Now, an adversary A submits (φ δ , ID, m) to the challenger CH , where δ ∈ Z q , and φ δ (sk ID ) := (g r , y+δ mod q). Then the challenger randomly chooses t $ ← − Z q and computes
Give σ = (A, R, c) to A, who will output (ID * , (m * , σ * )) := (ID, (m, (A, R, c−δ·H 2 (ID, A, m)))) as its forgery. Obviously, the target identity ID * together with the message-signature pair (m * , σ * ) can pass the verification of GG-IBVerify. In other words, the adversary will win the security game with probability 1 after making only one RKA-signing query.
• RKA in KGC level. For an adversary A launching RKA on the master key of KGC, he only needs to make one query (φ δ , ID, m) to the signing oracle, where φ δ (msk) = msk + δ mod q, for δ ∈ Z q . When obtaining the response σ = (A, R, c), which has the form of A = g t , R = g r , and
Obviously, this forgery can also pass the verification of GG-IBVerify. From the above two concrete illustrations, we know that the original GG-scheme will become insecure under RKA although it is secure in the security model of [17] . Hence, it is necessary to design new scheme(s) that can achieve RKA security for future applications.
IV. THE MODIFIED GG-SCHEME AND ITS RKA SECURITY
In this section, we modify the GG-scheme presented in Section III-A so that it can achieve some RKA security.
A. THE MODIFIED GG-SCHEME
The modified GG-scheme IBS is described as follows.
• IBGen(λ): Same as GG-IBGen(λ). • IBExt(msk, ID): Same as GG-IBExt(msk, ID). • IBSign(ID, sk ID , m): Same as GG-IBSign(ID, sk ID , m) except that the signature σ consists of (A, R, c) and an additional element B = g y , in which
That is, σ = (A, B, R, c If both of them hold, output 1. Otherwise, output 0. The correctness of this scheme can be easily verified.
B. THE RKA SECURITY FOR THE MODIFIED GG-SCHEME
Before presenting the security analysis of modified GG-scheme, we would like to introducing some underlying intuition about the design of the the modified GG-scheme and also explain why this modification makes it achieving the required RKA security.
From the concrete related-key attack presented in Section III-B, we know that any RKA adversary A in the user level can easily recover the signature σ * with respect to (w.r.t. for short) user's secret key sk ID = (g r , y) from the response σ w.r.t. the ''changed'' secret key φ δ (sk ID ) = (g r , y + δ mod q). Thus, in order to ''break'' the connection between σ * and σ , we add the information of the essential secret key y, which in fact is the value B = g y , into the hash function of H 2 , which will be viewed as a random oracle. In this case, if the secret key y is ''changed'' into y + δ, then the output of H 2 will be completely independent for both cases. In other words, the previous RKA queries will be ''useless'' when it intends to output a valid forgery. Therefore, now, the adversary A is not able to recover the correct signature from the obtained one based on its RKA query and naturally the RKA security holds in the user level.
The underlying intuition for the RKA security in KGC level is also similar and hence we omit it here.
1) RKA SECURITY IN USER LEVEL FOR THE MODIFIED GG-SCHEME
We first introduce the RKA security in user level for the modified GG-scheme as follows.
Theorem 1: If the discrete logarithm problem on G is hard and H 1 , H 2 are respectively modeled as random oracles, then the modified GG-scheme IBS presented in Section IV-A is Lin -UserKey-RKA secure. Here, Lin consists of functions φ µ,ν from G × Z q to itself, where φ µ,ν (g r , y) = (g r , µy + ν mod q),
Proof: Assume that A makes at most q H 1 , q H 2 and q S queries to H 1 -oracle, H 2 -oracle, and signing oracle, respectively. In addition, he will totally query q ID different identities in the q S signing queries. Denote by σ * = (A * , B * , R * , c * ) A's final forgery signature for the target identity ID * and message m * . Without loss of generality, we assume that A must query (ID * , A * , B * , m * ) to H 2 -oracle before outputting its final forgery.
Moreover, we also denote by E the event that σ * is valid (i.e. it can pass the verification of IBVerify) and R * appeared in some answer of signing query. Accordingly, NE denotes σ * is valid and R * did not appear in any answer of signing query. We will construct another two adversaries B 1 and B 2 attacking on the discrete logarithm problem on G by respectively invoking A in these two cases.
First, we consider the event E occurs in A's final forgery. In order to apply the multiple-forking lemma, we specify the following components.
• The input generator IG takes security parameter λ as input and generates a group G with prime order q (|q| ≥ λ) and generator g. Then pick r 0 $ ← − Z q and compute R 0 = g r 0 . Output X = (q, g, G, R 0 ). Return sk ID = (g r , y) to A and store (g r , ID), h into L H 1 .
-Signing Queries. For the j-th (1 ≤ j ≤ q S ) query (φ µ,ν , ID, m) to this oracle, F first checks if this ID appeared in L ID . If it is, recover R = g r from L ID . Otherwise, continue to check if this ID will be the i * -th new identity appeared in L ID . * If it is not, randomly pick r from Z q and set R = g r . * Else, set R = R 0 . VOLUME 8, 2020
Add (R, ID) into L ID and then randomly pick t, c from Z q . Compute
and return σ = (A, B, R, c) to A. Then store (ID, A, B, m) , h q H 2 +j into L H 2 . -Output. Finally, A outputs its forgery (ID * , (m * , σ * )), where σ * = (A * , B * , R * , c * ). If it is a valid forgery and 1) ID * has never been submitted to F for its private key, 2) σ * is not the answer of A's query (I, ID * , m * ) to the signing oracle, 3) ID * is just the i * -th identity appeared in L ID , F outputs (I , J , V * ) := (I , J , (ID * , m * , σ * )) when the item (ID * , A * , B * , m * ) appeared in the I -th record in L H 2 , and (R * , ID * ) appeared in the J -th record in L H 1 . Otherwise, output (0, 0, ⊥). This ends the description of F. Note that, F perfectly simulates Exp Lin -UserKey-RKA IBS, A (λ) for A. Moreover, F successfully guesses the event that ID * will appeared in the i * -th item of L ID , which occurs with probability 1/q ID . Therefore, it holds that
According to the Multiple-Forking Lemma, the probability frk F , 1 for B F ,1 satisfies
Next, we describe the procedure of B 1 and relate frk F , 1 with B 1 's advantage to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Concretely, given the tuple (q, g, G, g r 0 ), B 1 sets X = (q, g, G, g r 0 ), and invokes B F , 1 (X ) as well as F described above. If B F , 1 's output is ⊥, then output ⊥. Else, let (V * 0 , V * 1 ) be the output of B F ,1 . Parse V * 0 , V * 1 as (ID * , m * , (A * , B * , R * , c * 0 ) and
respectively. Let h J be the response of the J -th H 1 -oracle query on ID * and h I , h 1 I be the responses of the I -th H 2 -oracle queries on (ID * , A * , B * , m * ). Then it holds that
As a result, the target r 0 can be computed by
Therefore, it holds that
Now, we consider the event NE occurs in A's forgery. In this case, the adversary B 2 will attack on the master pubic key mpk = (q, g, G, h) with h = g z . That is, its target is to output z ∈ Z q . Similar as the previous case, we specify the components in Multiple-Forking Lemma as follows.
• IG(λ) : Generate cyclic group G with prime order q (|q| ≥ λ) and generator g. Then randomly choose z $ ← − Z q and compute h = g z . Output X := (q, g, G, h). • Let Z = Z q . For X , and h 1 , · · · , h q H 2 , h q H 2 +1 , · · · , h q H 2 +q S in Z q , F is constructed as follows.
-Initialization. Give X = (q, g, G, h) to A and initialize two empty lists L H 1 and L H 2 , which will store the query-answer pairs to H 1 and H 2 oracles. 
Then return sk ID := (R, y) to A and store ((R, ID), h ) into L H 1 . According to the Multiple-Forking Lemma, we know that frk F , 3 ≥ acc F acc 3 will approximately be 1024 and 768 bits, respectively, in 128-bit security requirement.
In addition, we remark that, for the verifier who will obtain multiple signatures from the same signer, he only needs to correctly receive one signature σ = (A, B, R, c) . The items B and R will not be transmitted to this verifier since they are common for next signatures. In this case, the communication efficiency will be improved greatly. Specifically, for 128-bit security, the communication cost will be reduced from 1024 bits to 512 bits for the later signatures. Note that, this also holds for the original GG-scheme.
• Computational Efficiency. To generate a signature σ = (A, B, R, c) , in the modified GG-scheme, a user needs to compute A, B, and c, in which the computations of A and B are two exponentiations and c's computation consists of a small number of multiplications in Z q and hash-operation. In fact, the multiplications in Z q and hash-operation can be ignored when they are compared with the exponentiations. Moreover, we also know that, in the original GG-scheme, a computation of a signature only consists of one exponentiation of A and the ignorable computation of c. Hence, the computation cost for the modified GG-scheme will be larger with one exponentiation.
As for the verification, we note that both of the schemes need to compute one multi-exponentiation mexp (3), which has a cost of about 1.5 times that of a single exponentiation [9] . The only possible differences lie in the computation of hash-operation and some comparisons of group elements, which can also be ignored. In order to give an intuitive computational comparisons for the two schemes, we implement them within the framework of ''Charm'' in [1] . All our experiments are run on a computer with Intel Core i5-6200U CPU 2.3GHz and 2GB RAM running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 64bit and Python 3.4. Each instance is repeated 100 times and the average time is computed. Then the time consumptions of signing and verification for 128-bit security are presented in Table 1 . From the above comparisons, we see that, after modifying the original GG-scheme, both communication and computational costs may become larger. However, we remark that the sacrificial costs are used to achieve the stronger RKA security. The total comparisons of the two schemes can be found in Table 1 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the RKA security for IBS schemes. This research is very necessary since the existing efficient GG-scheme may become completely insecure under RKA.
However, after slight modifying it, we can easily obtain RKA secure IBS scheme. Finally, we analyze the performance of the modified GG-scheme. 
